How My Secret protects your data

What is built, how it works, and what is not solved yet.

Keys stay with you

Your master passphrase is stretched with Argon2id into the keys that protect your vault. Items and files are encrypted with XChaCha20-Poly1305 using libsodium, on your device, before anything syncs.

The server never receives your passphrase, your recovery key or any decryption key.

What the server can see

  • Encrypted items and encrypted file chunks.
  • Item ids, revision numbers, timestamps, sizes and device ids.
  • Your email, your passkey public keys and your devices’ public keys.
  • Per session: a digest of the token, its expiry, the app name and the IP address, so you can review and end sessions.

Signing in is not unlocking

Account sign-in uses an email code, or a passkey once you add one. Optional TOTP adds a second factor. Sign-in gives your device a short-lived session for sync and account actions.

Your vault opens only with your master passphrase, a recovery key or the biometric key on that device. Sensitive actions, such as removing a passkey or deleting the account, ask you to verify again first.

If you lose access

There is no backdoor and no operator recovery. If you lose both your passphrase and your recovery key, no one can open your vault, including us.

Keep your recovery key offline, and keep an encrypted export somewhere safe.

Devices and revoking them

Each device holds its own key. Revoking a device ends its sessions and rotates its key envelopes. It does not erase what that device already holds, and the interface says so.

An account that signs in with an email code only has no durable revocation: whoever holds the mailbox can enrol a new device. Adding a passkey closes that gap.

Limits we have not solved

  • No independent security audit yet.
  • The web app is a separate attack surface, so it is limited: encrypted export only and no browser autofill.
  • Shared items require the recipient to have an account and a verified sharing key. File attachments are not included in item sharing.
  • The phone apps do not yet have a device key, so a phone session covers account actions but not sync.
  • Rotating the vault key is not implemented, so revoking a device does not protect items it already holds.